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Until recently, mainstream law-based policing and crimi-
nal justice, as well as traditional criminology, have paid rela-
tively little attention to crimes and destructive acts affecting 
the environment, and to the human and non-human victims 
of such events. Acts of corporate pollution and trafficking in 
endangered species have attracted some attention but in gene-
ral these have not been priorities. And yet, as Skinnider (2013: 
1) points out, “Environmental crime affects all of society” and 
“can have detrimental consequences on the economies and 
security of a country”. Harms and damages can be felt imme-
diately or only in the long-term and may be ‘direct or indirect’, 
their causes may arise in many different ways, their origins 
may be ‘point source or diffuse’, their effects may be ‘individu-
al or cumulative’, ‘local, trans-boundary or global’, and those 
responsible might be individuals, groups, corporations, go-
vernments or criminal enterprises (ibid.).
Over the past few decades, awareness of the financial as 
well as human costs of environmental damage has increased 
and this has registered with some who are not otherwise envi-
ronmentally ‘green’. For example, the World Economic Forum 
has drawn attention to the global challenges posed by our 
poor stewardship and use of water resources which they see 
“as having the potential to seriously disrupt social stability, 
upend business supply chains, imperil food and energy pro-
duction, and generally make life miserable for billions of pe-
ople” (Walton, 2014). The challenge of climate change is now 
more widely understood, and the profits involved in illicit 
trafficking in protected species and precious resources such 
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as conflict diamonds or illegally harvested timber, have been 
recognized as very sizeable. All of this has meant that it is not 
only traditional environmentalists who have taken note of de-
velopments but also those concerned with national security, 
international relations and economic development. A report 
on The Globalisation of Crime from the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (2010: 149) points out that trafficking 
of environmental resources is now a key challenge for some 
developing nations: “Many emerging economies are based on 
exporting raw materials, but under-resourced governments 
may lack the capacity to regulate the exploitation of these as-
sets. Rather than promoting economic progress, poorly ma-
naged natural wealth can become a cause of bad governance, 
corruption or even violent conflict.” 
Foster (2001: 373; see also South, 2012) argues that con-
temporary threats to national security are no longer simply 
those of a military nature but that “numerous new threats 
derive directly or indirectly from the rapidly changing relati-
onship between humanity and the earth’s natural systems and 
resources. The unfolding stresses in this relationship initially 
manifest themselves as ecological stresses and resource scar-
cities. Later they translate into economic stresses – inflation, 
unemployment, capital scarcity, and monetary instability. 
Ultimately, these economic stresses convert into social unrest 
and political instability.” 
And in making this case in 2001, Foster noted that he 
was not the first to do so – observing that Ullman (1983) 
and Matthews (1989: 162–177) had also argued that “global 
developments now suggest the need for ... [a] broadening 
definition of national security to include resource, environ-
mental and demographic issues”. This reflects what Popovski 
and Turner (2008: 7) refer to as the need for change across 
the broader canvas of international law, order and legitimacy: 
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“As norms evolve and develop, international law must adapt. 
Laws are codified rules – fixed representations of how society 
believes the world should be ordered, in a snapshot of norms 
and expectations at the time. But as society changes and new 
problems emerge, so norms adaptively respond, while fixed 
rules may no longer be relevant.” 
Social change and new problems related to environmental 
matters have indeed encouraged greater interest from nati-
onal and international law-enforcement, regulatory agencies 
and legislative bodies as well as stimulating a rapidly growing 
field of relevance within criminology. 
2 A ‘Green’ Criminology and Environmental 
Crime
A new field of a ‘green’ or ‘conservation’ or ‘eco-’ crimi-
nology, alongside allied work on environmental justice and 
victimization, is now represented by a substantial literature 
(Ellefson, Sollund, & Larsen, 2012; Eman, Meško, & Fields, 
2009; Gibbs, Gore, McGarrell, & Rivers, 2010; Lynch, 1990; 
Lynch & Stretesky, 2003; Sollund, 2008; South, 1998, 2014; 
South & Brisman, 2013a; South, Eman, & Meško, 2014; 
Walters, 2010; White, 2008; White & Heckenberg, 2014). 
Simply put, this kind of perspective argues that a wide range 
of actions imperil the planet as well as the future of humanity 
and other species, and these crimes and harms need to be re-
cognised and responded to. 
One of the earliest sociologically-oriented criminologists 
to draw attention to the need for concern about environmen-
tal crimes and acts of ‘ecocide’ was the Slovenian researcher 
Pečar whose work is described by Eman, Meško, and Fields 
(2009: 578) as follows: 
“Environmental crime, according to Pečar, is every per-
manent or temporary act or process which has a negative 
influence on the environment, people’s health or natural 
resources, including: building, changing, abandonment and 
destruction of buildings; waste processing and eliminati-
on of waste; emissions into water, air or soil; transport and 
handling of dangerous substances; damaging or destructi-
on of natural resources; reduction of biological diversity or 
reduction of natural genetic resources; and other activities 
or interventions, which put the environment at risk. Later, 
[Pečar] ... defined ... environmental crime [as the result of] 
selfishness, which is determined by the need for profit as-
sociated with the control of nature [and] characterized the 
pollution of nature and the environment as a devaluation of 
the environment, what he also named ‘ecocide’ – intentional 
destruction of the living environment. Under this term the 
author classified examples of waste dumping and negative 
environmental interventions.”
Subsequent work (see Higgins, Short, & South, 2013; 
Lynch & Stretesky, 2014; South et al., 2014; White & 
Heckenberg, 2014) has followed along very similar lines. 
Skinnider (2013: 2) summarises possible definitions of 
‘environmental crime’ as follows. One legalistic and “narrow 
interpretation of environmental crime is that it covers only 
activities prohibited by current criminal law”. However in 
criminological and sociological approaches it might be more 
common to adopt a definition that would “also include any il-
legal activities or formal rule‐breaking, whatever form the rule 
might be” and this would therefore include administrative and 
regulatory sanctions. Importantly here, Skinnider (ibid.) ma-
kes a point that “the influence of business interests over law 
and regulation” means that “conduct that might be criminal 
in one jurisdiction might be dealt with by lesser sanctions in 
others”. And finally Skinnider (ibid.) notes that a further defi-
nition includes activities which are ‘lawful but awful’ (see also 
Passas, 2005) and this “recognizes the fact that many environ-
mental disruptions are actually legal and take place with the 
consent of society”. This is a point to which I will return.
In the world of regulation and law enforcement the pro-
blems posed by environmental crimes and harms call for us 
to do familiar things better and more innovatively, and for 
new ways of doing things urgently and collaboratively - but 
at the same time, new challenges also re-enforce the wisdom 
of some old messages – in this case that ‘prevention is better 
than cure’. 
3 Prevention of Environmental Crime - and its 
Limitations
Weber, Marmo, and Fishwick (2014: 233) suggest that: 
“The study of transnational crimes such as trafficking of hu-
man beings, cross-border trade in illicit goods, and environ-
mental destruction opens up important new frontiers in cri-
minological inquiry, and invites researchers, practitioners and 
students to engage with international legal instruments and 
UN-sanctioned crime prevention techniques.”
On this note, these authors draw attention to the 2002 UN 
guidelines regarding crime prevention which are intentionally 
broad and define the benefits of crime prevention in a way 
that we can easily see as applicable if directed at environmen-
tal breaches and harms. The guidelines state that: There is cle-
ar evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not 
only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote com-
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munity safety and contribute to the sustainable development 
of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances 
the quality of life of all citizens ... (in Weber et al., 2014: 111). 
Governments do take the matter of prevention seriously 
and generally point out that this involves shared responsibility. 
As one example, the advice on pollution prevention from the 
UK Government Environment Agency points out that “bu-
sinesses and individuals are responsible for complying with 
environmental regulations and for preventing pollution of air, 
land and water. Many thousands of pollution incidents occur 
each year, originating from factories, farms, transport activi-
ties and even homes. Each incident is an offence and can result 
in prosecution as well as environmental damage. However, 
most cases are avoidable ...” (Environment Agency, 2013).
Prevention and avoidance of breaches of laws and regu-
lations are desirable for many reasons but the idea of shared 
responsibility for prevention is not always accepted. Or the 
‘message is received’ but ‘the meaning is not understood’. The 
strategies of denial and techniques of neutralization that are 
so familiar to us from the criminological literature on other 
subjects (Cohen, 1993; Sykes & Matza, 1957) are often at work 
here. Furthermore, as McGarrell and Hipple (2014: 2) note, a 
wide range of criminological research evidence suggests that 
“the adoption of new policy or practice often suffers from im-
plementation failure” and that “even in cases where ... support 
by key decision-makers and resource constraints ... [ is] not an 
issue, weak implementation’ can hinder impact, while reasons 
for implementation failure can be as diverse as ‘ideological 
conflict, resource constraints, opposition from line-level ac-
tors, poor communication, and lack of clarity and consistency 
in policy or intended practice.”
Politics and law enforcement frequently share a short-
term horizon dictated by seeking the approval of the general 
public, superiors and peers and avoiding the uncomfortable 
and unpopular. But the ‘here and now’ must not be the only 
preoccupation of those tasked with the protection of popula-
tions and prevention of crimes and harms. 
A framework governed by the concept of ‘impact’, as me-
asured in terms of proximity along a timeline (now, impen-
ding, or future), geography (distance – close, remote) and 
the degree of seriousness of foreseeable (and, if speculating 
further, ‘unforeseeable’) consequences needs to be part of the 
toolkit of those concerned about environmental crime-pre-
vention and response. 
The point about ‘geography’ and distance is to remind us 
that we are all victims or potential victims and we should avo-
id sheltering behind denial and what can be called ‘strategic 
ignorance’ (McGoey, 2012) – in this case the idea that a threat 
that is close to ‘us’ is something to worry about but that a threat 
a long distance away is not. All environmental crimes are of re-
levance and geographical mapping and data would help us to 
identify what resources we need and where – locally, regional-
ly, globally – in order to aid prevention and response. And in 
terms of both geography and time, while the effects of a single 
offence at one location or at one point in time may not appear 
significant, as Skinnider (2013: 1) recognises, “the cumulative 
environmental consequences of repeated violations over time 
can be considerable”.
Table 1:   Temporal and geographical dimensions of the chal-
lenges of environmental crimes and harms 
Crimes and Harms Consequences 
Familiar Crimes Crime / Harms - Past and Present 
(now and  known)
Future Crises Regional impacts and harms 
(anticipated and unanticipated)
Forecast Catastrophes Regional to Global Consequences
One further, related, problem is that environmental cri-
mes can commonly be regarded by perpetrators and indeed 
by the public as ‘victimless crimes’ – the ‘denial of the victim’. 
One general message from many studies is that inequalities in 
patterns of victimization and in availability of resources devo-
ted to prevention, mitigation and support persist in this area 
(Camacho, 1988; Croall, 2010; Hall, 2013; Stretesky & Lynch, 
1999) (although this is also the case in more traditional and 
familiar examples of crime, harm and victimization and the 
responses from law-enforcement and legislators). There will 
however always be a victim if only because the chain of effects 
we should be conscious of, and concerned about, is that some-
where down the line, environmental damage and degradation 
has an effect on dependent species – which includes us. 
In fact, societies tend to minimise the significance of en-
vironmental crime and damage. According to Lynch (2013: 
49), if we were to compare rates of ‘ordinary crime’ to environ-
mental harms and negative impacts, the latter would signifi-
cantly outweigh the former. Lynch (ibid.) argues that for this 
reason we need to re-think our categorizations regarding vic-
tims: “The definitions of victims and victimization incidents 
commonly found within criminological literature illustrate 
the restrictive scope of the traditional criminological gaze and 
frame of reference. By taking a broader frame of reference, 
green criminology calls attention to the extensive array of vi-
olence humans produce and the large number of victim and 
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victim incidents that escape the attention of orthodox crimi-
nological approaches.” 
Not least among the questions raised by a broader defi-
nition of the idea of the ‘victim’ is the issue of whether the 
environment itself should be seen as a subject or object of vic-
timisation. 
In the traditional view of Victimology, it is people and 
only people – the human species not other species or the 
wider environment – that would qualify as ‘victims’. This is 
reflected in the utilitarian and anthropocentric view of nature 
and the environment as existing “to be appropriated, proces-
sed, consumed and disposed of in a manner which best suits 
the immediate interests of human beings” (Halsey & White, 
1998: 349). Although this view can be stretched to embrace 
the ‘long-term’ in a way that includes human individuals or 
communities of future generations, acknowledging the prin-
ciple of intergenerational equity (Skinnider, 2013: 7). 
Alternatively, an ecocentric perspective would view “hu-
man beings as merely one component of complex ecosystems 
that should be preserved for their own sake. Here the victim is 
specific environments and non-human species. Scholars from 
the animal rights perspective take the position that animals 
are themselves victims as ‘individuals’, not just part of nature” 
(Beirne, 2009; Sollund, 2012). Finally, a biocentric perspective 
might see “any human activity that disrupts a biotic system 
as environmental crime. These last two perspectives priori-
tize the intrinsic value of ecosystems over human interests” 
(Halsey & White, 1998; Skinnider, 2013: 7–8).
Such categories will continue to stimulate important 
criminological and philosophical debate although it may be 
unlikely that legal and regulatory systems will embrace either 
ecocentric or biocentric principles in the very near future.
4 Enforcement and Prosecution of Environ-
mental Crimes and Harms – and their 
Limitations.
International environmental law has been a growing area 
and has stimulated expansion in criminal law in domestic 
contexts. Simultaneously, national agencies have been invited 
to come together in a variety of transnational policing and 
security networks and alliances such as environmental crime 
campaigns and committees led by Interpol and the United 
Nations and in globally-regional initiatives such as the Asian 
Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental 
Crime and the UNODC Partnership against Transnational 
Crime through Regional Organised Law Enforcement – 
PATROL (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). 
The enforcement of environmental law and regulation is a 
complex matter. It can involve a number of agencies and give 
rise to a variety of tensions in the operationalization of di-
rections to detect, deter and prevent. In many jurisdictions it 
is not the police but environmental regulators that have pri-
mary responsibility for the application of law and securing of 
compliance, often demonstrating a preference for use of non-
-criminal penalties and adoption of a civil sanctions regime. 
Such regimes may depend upon administrative, paper-based 
monitoring and encouragement of compliance and this is 
probably easier to apply when dealing with relatively low level 
and minor offences. In political contexts where there is he-
sitancy about being seen as ‘anti-business’ and where public 
funds are scarce and scrutinised, then a focus on the ‘low-le-
vel and minor’ may be encouraged and constitute the bulk of 
occurrences processed. 
This is, of course, because the enforcement of laws and 
regulations takes place in contexts shaped by political viewpo-
ints and prevailing economic policies - so in some circum-
stances (and particularly in most countries in recent years) 
- the dominant context has been one supporting deregulation 
and encouraging voluntary compliance. The proposition here 
is that market competition will provide effective and efficient 
remedies - and efficient companies will willingly comply and 
engage in self-policing because this is a cost-effective system 
that does not impose a cost burden on them or their custo-
mers. However, generally speaking - and one would have 
thought this unsurprising – the idea of cost-effectiveness that 
most companies adopt is to try to save money, cut corners 
and ‘turn a blind eye’ to potentially expensive problems. As 
Stretesky (2006) has shown in a series of studies, self-policing 
and self-reporting of infractions is an attractive approach par-
ticularly for larger companies because they are multiple offen-
ders and value control over how, and how many, offences are 
reported; the conclusion drawn is that generally self-policing 
as an approach seems to neither improve nor deteriorate the 
environmental track record of a company. It may therefore be 
economically efficient but it does not seem to add anything in 
terms of effectiveness. Other approaches, promoted by a wide 
range of commentators, would argue for an appeal to moral 
and ethical principles, and the exercise of education, naming 
and shaming. And all of this is unarguably ideally what should 
work. But regrettably it does not seem to do so and profits 
come before prevention, companies use corporate social re-
sponsibility programmes in a cynical manner to claim good 
citizenship, and despite the importance of ‘brand recogniti-
on’, unless the media glare and corporate guilt are particularly 
clear and unavoidable neither companies nor customers pay 
long-term attention to stories told and lessons taught via the 
‘naming and shaming’ process. This is not to say that there is 
no place for its strategic use as a technique, just that expecta-
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tions about its power to reform should be realistically modest 
(Braithwaite & Drahos, 2002).
In terms of delivering ‘enforcement’, frequently agencies 
can be hampered by mission confusion, dilution of resources 
and compromise because they have too many competing pri-
orities. For example, administrative efficiencies, budget cuts 
and new strategies may mean the same body is responsible 
for encouraging compliance in the course of doing business 
but also charged with prosecution and penalties in cases of 
offending (Prez, 2000). The mission and governance of such 
agencies can also be compromised by systemic problems of 
‘regulatory capture’ (Davis & Abraham, 2013) - where senior 
decision-makers or influential inspectors within regulatory 
bodies are largely (in one way or another – e.g. past or likely 
future employment, professional or social links) representati-
ves of the regulated. 
Environmental offending poses particular problems for 
those involved in detection and response. For example, fin-
ding proof of the offence and of the damaging nature of its ef-
fects and consequences; and working in a social context whe-
re members of the general public do not see such offences as a 
high priority, and where business and industry may routinely 
operate with assumptions that some actions and their outco-
mes have always been accepted whether legal or illegal and 
should continue to be regarded as unproblematic. And should 
matters get to court or a tribunal, legal argument can result in 
the ‘trivialisation’ of injurious actions (Du Rees, 2001) with 
little by way of deterrent or punitive penalty resulting. 
As with many other kinds of crime or cases of non-cri-
minal breaking of rules or regulations, the failure to take 
measures to avoid the problem is significant. For businesses, 
non compliance with ‘good practice’ and with efforts aimed 
at prevention can, as noted earlier, follow from short-term 
assumptions about cost-savings and familiar narratives of de-
nial – ‘whatever I do won’t matter or make a difference’, ‘no-
-one will catch me’, ‘others are more guilty of this than me’, 
and so on, and because there have always been problems with 
the inadequacy of resources for enforcement of such rules and 
laws it is possible that offenders will remain undetected or not 
prosecuted (Du Rees, 2001). 
At the same time, official and high-level support for sanc-
tions can wax and wane illustrating how vulnerable to politi-
cal values and the social construction of public agendas envi-
ronmental law and enforcement actually is. A good example 
of this is the way in which the idea of environmental justice 
has developed, at times gaining prominence while at other ti-
mes being relegated to the sidelines.
5 Environmental Justice and the ‘Winds of 
Change’
According to Lewis (2012: 87) environmental justice can 
be defined in terms of “inequality or unfairness in the dis-
tribution of environmental burdens, where there is exclusion 
from the processes which determine how that distribution 
will be effected, or where disproportionate distribution is not 
balanced by sufficient reparation. This extends to potential 
injustices between developed and developing states, and be-
tween present and future generations.” In this way environ-
mental justice and human rights can be seen as tied together 
and there is some expression of this in various international 
treaties, in some national laws and constitutions, in propo-
sitions that environmental rights should be seen as human 
rights and in cases where human rights regimes explicitly in-
corporate environmental rights for current and future gene-
rations (Gianolla, 2013; Hiskes, 2008). However it is difficult 
to achieve and maintain high-level support for such ideals or 
to mobilise effective response in cases where both rights and 
the environment suffer, are violated and destroyed (South & 
Brisman, 2013b; Ruiz, 2011). To enact environmental justi-
ce on any basis requires action but experience indicates that 
self-interest and contested evidence (Hulme, 2009) disincline 
many or most from seeking genuine change in their own lives 
or on a broader scale while political will is swayed by short-
term priorities.
In the U.K. in the 1990s and early 2000s, NGOs such as 
Friends of the Earth Scotland, had raised the profile and le-
gal standing of the concept in Scotland, England and Wales 
but, as elsewhere, in the context of an economic recession, 
governments have become wary of environmental protection 
measures in case these are seen as a burden on business and 
the economy. So Pedersen (2014) asks “What happened to en-
vironmental justice?” and observes that “one thing which the 
British understanding of environmental justice shares with 
those developed elsewhere” is “a susceptibility to political 
neglect in accordance with executive winds of change”. Thus 
he argues that, particularly in the UK, “environmental justice 
is today most notable by its absence when it comes to official 
directives, guidelines and statements”. This development un-
doubtedly chimes with one aspect of populist conservatism 
in the U.K. reflected in dislike of European Union interventi-
onism in the area of environmental regulation. 
All of this raises important questions about how satisfac-
tory current systems of policing, regulation and law are in a 
world increasingly aware of – and increasingly facing – chan-
ging environmental problems? Although awareness of envi-
ronmental issues has grown, the problem of response faces 
familiar tensions and dilemmas, and meanwhile, the political 
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agenda has a tendency to move uncomfortable and difficult 
challenges up and down the scales of importance and urgency, 
with resources diminishing as the priority reduces.
6 Legality, Legitimacy and Justice
Environmental crimes and harms may be committed by 
those who can draw on legal standing and legitimate status; 
such actions should be responded to on the basis of legality, 
legitimacy and justice. But the relationships between these po-
werful notions, and the gaps between them, are complex and 
significant. According to Fabienne (2014: section 1), “if legi-
timacy is interpreted descriptively, it refers to people’s beliefs 
about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations. 
In his sociology, Max Weber put forward a very influential 
account of legitimacy that excludes any recourse to normative 
criteria ... According to Weber, that a political regime is legi-
timate means that its participants have certain beliefs or faith 
...” and “Weber distinguishes among three main sources of 
legitimacy – understood as both the acceptance of authority 
and of the need to obey its commands. People may have faith 
in a particular political or social order because it has been 
there for a long time (tradition), because they have faith in 
the rulers (charisma), or because they trust its legality – spe-
cifically the rationality of the rule of law  ...”. However, values 
and normative judgements do intrude into interpretations of 
the relationship between law, legitimacy and justice.  So trust 
in the legality of what governments or political authorities do 
may be misplaced – or perhaps more accurately, trust in the 
justice of what the powerful do may be unfounded. If this is 
so, then as governments make the law and corporations can 
find ways to bend it, certain actions may be legal but in a nor-
mative sense they may be neither just nor legitimate. 
In order for criminal justice and regulatory response to 
avoid the erosion of legitimacy and claims to justice then, as 
Skinnider (2013: 3) observes, “there is a need for [such] ... sys-
tems to function with certainty in order to be fair and consis-
tent. The question then is whether environmental harm can fit 
neatly into the existing” systems of criminal justice, regulation 
and law? If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then, in turn, in 
the anthropocene 21st century, as Popovski and Turner (2008: 7) 
suggest: “The legitimacy of law can be undermined by its struc-
tural inability to face urgent problems and respond to pressing 
issues.” If institutions – political and legislative – fail societies 
locally or globally because they do not respond appropriately, 
for example with sufficient resource to meet immediate challen-
ges or willingness to commit to principles of intergenerational 
justice and plan for the needs of generations of the future, then 
legitimacy will be questionable and eroded. Certainly neither 
environmental nor inter-generational justice are being served.
Popovski and Turner (2008: 6) remind us that “legitimacy 
needs law as much as law needs legitimacy”. The two need to 
be able to catch up with each other and be complementary 
and environmental crime provides a perfect example of an 
area of hugely significant activity where, at present, they do 
not always do this. Of course, sometimes flexibility is needed 
in law. Equally, sometimes claims to legality and legitimacy do 
not really deserve to be respected or supported. As Popovski 
and Turner (2008: 6) argue, “appeals to legitimacy outside the 
law are vulnerable to opportunism by powerful states, with 
dangerous consequences ...”. So powerful states can and do 
opt out of attempts to create internationally legally-binding 
environmental controls and agreements. Similarly, big busi-
ness often makes successful calls for exemption or exceptional 
leniency with regard to environmental regulation and argu-
es that it is authoritarian and misunderstands the reality of 
business needs to aim to impose criminal or serious finan-
cial penalties on commercial offenders. Again, opt-outs and 
exemptions are legal and they have legitimacy but trust in that 
legitimacy may be eroded  - and they do not serve the wider 
interests of justice.
This is an analysis supported by scrutiny of the shaping, 
by external interests, of the requirements of the mandatory 
Impact Assessments now expected in the case of all European 
Union policies. Smith et al. (2010) conducted an examina-
tion of internal documents from British American Tobacco 
(BAT), disclosed as a result of litigation in the United States, 
as well as a review of other relevant literature and intervie-
ws with key informants, and show that from 1995, BAT wor-
ked with other businesses to promote European regulatory 
reforms that would be favourable to large corporations, in 
particular, the establishment of a business-orientated form 
of Impact Assessment. A lobbying campaign, led by BAT but 
also involving a network of other companies, ensured binding 
changes to the Treaty of Amsterdam that require policyma-
kers to minimize legislative burdens on businesses. This the-
reby shapes all future EU policy decisions and increases the 
likelihood that policies will benefit corporations rather than 
citizens. This is a clear example of a campaign and subsequent 
state of affairs that is unjust but perfectly legal and part of a 
process accorded legitimacy, although if widely known about 
it is also a case that could test faith in that legitimacy. The 
authors of this analysis also show that other business sectors 
such as the chemical industry – a frequent pollution offender 
– have since used Impact Assessments to “delay and weaken 
EU regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemical Substances (REACH)” (Smith et 
al., 2010: 9, Box 2). 
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7 Environmental Politics and Participation.
One hope for enhanced legitimacy and justice in legal and 
enforcement systems lies with demand for greater consulta-
tion, participation and public involvement. Pedersen (2014) 
raises a question related to developments in the UK, asking 
whether the 2008 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 
which emphasises use of civil rather than criminal sanctions, 
will have implications for environmental justice. This could, he 
notes, be a welcome development if it is successful in encoura-
ging and delivering greater compliance. But Pedersen (2014: 
90) also suggests it could make even more of a contribution 
to environmental justice in terms of legitimacy and inclusion 
if the communities affected and distressed by environmental 
damage were to be engaged in the processes of “negotiation 
and application of enforcement undertakings where these 
include provisions for community compensation”. As yet (in 
2014) there is no indication that this is happening but even if 
the prospects for genuine involvement are not good this is an 
important point and should not be overlooked. As Bodansky 
(1999: 618) has pointed out, “lack of public participation has 
been one of the principal elements of the democratic deficit 
critique” in the European Union, and “the transparency defi-
cit is perhaps even worse on the implementation and enforce-
ment side [of EU governance] where the use of committees to 
elaborate and apply standards ... is notoriously obscure.” 
Legitimacy is enhanced by participation and – in theory 
if not necessarily in practice – movements in international 
law are seen by some as leading to increased and enhanced 
public involvement in environmental matters. International 
agreements such as the Aarhus Convention are supposed to 
be leading towards citizen rights to environmental informati-
on, a voice in decision-making and “access to legal remedies 
where environmental laws are broken” (Christman, 2013: 6). 
However, it has to be recognised that while provision of in-
formation is one thing - the rights of citizens to meaningfully 
participate in decision-making is quite another – and the-
ir willingness and ability to engage is something else again. 
Furthermore, as Christman (ibid.) neatly puts it, while citi-
zens may be “invited to submit comments on an activity ... 
decision-making rests with government”. 
In fact, in the interests of transparency and legitimacy, 
legally created opportunities for public participation have 
been opening up and may multiply – but they have their li-
mitations. As Bodansky (1999: 619) clarifies: “In speaking 
of participation by ‘the public’, we are indulging in a bit of a 
euphemism. What is meant more precisely is participation by 
non-governmental groups such as Greenpeace [and others] 
which often have opposing positions and may or may not ref-
lect the ‘public interest’ – if such a thing exists at all. Indeed, 
even if international meetings were opened up and NGOs gi-
ven unrestricted access, few members of the public would as a 
practical matter be able to participate.”2 
Nonetheless, as Pedersen (2014: 2) points out, it may pro-
ve to be significant at both international and national state le-
vels, that a recent report from the UN Independent Expert on 
Human Rights and the Environment has suggested that states 
run the risk of failing to satisfy their responsibilities in rela-
tion to human rights if domestic environmental laws are not 
enforced – and presumably this includes taking seriously any 
provisions to engage public participation.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that environmental issues have come to a 
position of some greater prominence on policy, enforcement 
and criminological agendas. However, for all the desirability 
and promise of crime prevention orientated toward environ-
mental offending it is an under-developed field while enforce-
ment and legal responses face considerable challenges ranging 
from apathy to resistance. Nonetheless, with regard to the fu-
ture momentum of initiatives to take environmental law en-
forcement and regulatory compliance seriously, it is important 
to recognise that even though the political profile of environ-
mental issues may fall as well as rise, some of the key features 
of actions and frameworks of response are being consistently 
pursued. Furthermore, in terms of the ‘slow capacity’ for law 
to catch up with the ‘dynamic conditions’ of international re-
lations and global challenges, globally shared problems such 
as the impact of climate change may help to encourage some 
international legal and law enforcement harmonisation while 
discouraging and penalising “behaviour that could be legal but 
illegitimately harming the environment” (Popovski & Turner, 
2008: 7). Taken seriously, the problem of legal but illegitimate 
harms to the environment needs to be examined in the context 
of the gaps between legality, legitimacy and justice. 
Greater public engagement and participation could be-
nefit environmental crime prevention and actions to detect 
and mitigate environmental harms, not least in enhancing the 
perceived status, importance and legitimacy of such activities. 
This will not be easy however as there are various barriers to 
genuine participation. The most promising scenario for future 
crime prevention is one in which we recognise that we are 
individually and collectively responsible for the health of our 
environment and that we or future generations will suffer if 
we do not preserve it. 
2  Italics added by author (N. South).
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From the point of view of a ‘green’ criminology, the ul-
timate environmental victim is the planet – we share it and 
it sustains life. There cannot be any better argument for de-
veloping and implementing strategies to prevent crimes that 
damage the environment and for enforcing laws that are de-
signed to protect it.
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